Hi!

I am a PhD candidate in Economics at University College London

I am on the 2024-25 Job Market!

You can find my CV [here]

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Research Fields:

Microeconomic Theory, Bounded Rationality, Behavioural Economics

Email:

alexander.clyde.econ@gmail.com

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Job Market Paper

Narrow Inference and Incentive Design [Draft]

Abstract

There is evidence that people struggle to do causal inference in complex multidimensional environments. This paper explores the consequences of this in a principal-agent setting. A principal chooses a mechanism to screen an agent. The agent makes choices on multiple dimensions, and infers the effect of each action separately without properly controlling for the other actions. I characterize the principal's optimal mechanism when facing an agent who does such `narrow' inference, and contrast it with their optimal mechanism when the agent is fully rational. I show that the principal can benefit from narrow inference, and identify cases where this holds.

Working Papers

Proxy Variables and Feedback Effects in Decision Making [Draft]

Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

When using data, often an analyst only has access to proxies or measurements of the true variables of interest. I propose a framework that models economic decision makers as ‘flawed statisticians’ who assume potentially noisy proxy variables are perfectly measured. Due to feedback from the choices into data, a notion of equilibrium is required to close the model. I illustrate the concept with applications to policing/crime and market entry. In these examples, we see that very small imperfections in the proxy variable can lead to large distortions in beliefs. I characterize all strategies that can arise as equilibria when measurement is arbitrarily close to perfect.